Standards in reporting Software Flaws: **SCAP**, CVE and CWE (Part 2)

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Who am I ?

- **Job**
  - Assistant Professor of Information Assurance at IS&T since Fall 2008
- **Research highlights**
  - Regulatory Requirements driven Risk Assessment
    - Using the semantic web to bridge the gap from high-level regulations to low-level technical evidence (Domain: SCADA)
  - Software Assurance in the Development Lifecycle
    - Building semantic templates for the most egregious software flaws
  - Cyber attack modeling and forecasting (CyCast)
    - Exploring disturbances in the human network to predict cyber attacks
- **Teaching**
  - Software Assurance (seniors/grad) New !
  - Foundations of Information Assurance (seniors/grad)
  - Introduction to Information Assurance (Freshmen) New !
  - Introduction to Computer Science II (Freshmen/Sophomore)

A two part talk (Recap Part 1)

- SCAP
  - What is it?
  - What does it do?
  - What will it take to realize its potential?
  - What do I need to do to start preparing for it?
- How can we better understand vulnerabilities
  - Research on semantic templates built from CWE and CVE enumerations

SCAP Philosophy (Recap Part 1)



Different Roles and Responsibilities

- **Information Assurance** professionals tend to focus on the protection of systems that they may NOT have built
  - Extrinsic and deployed view of the system
  - SCAP is geared towards improving the efforts of IA professionals (Vulnerability Assessment/ Hardening)
- **Software Assurance** professionals tend to focus on the development of software systems with security BUILT-IN
  - Intrinsic and functional view of the system
  - Weakness, attack and secure coding enumerations are geared towards improving the efforts of developers

Why Jonny Can't write secure code?

- *Johnny, avoid these weaknesses…. Period!*
  - Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE)
- *Johnny…learn from your mistakes*
  - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
- *Johnny…these are the ways of the bad guys*
  - Common Attack Patterns Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
- *Johnny…these are ways to develop secure code*
  - CERT secure coding guidelines

Poor Johnny !


42976
CVE Vulnerabilities
CWE v.19
668 Weaknesses
1043 Pages
Countless Do's
and Don'ts
CAPEC
311 Attack
Patterns

Using Semantic Templates to Study Vulnerabilities Recorded in Large Software Repositories

Me

Harvey Siy



Yan Wu

Outline

- Information overload in the study of vulnerabilities
  - Large software repositories
  - Vulnerability databases
  - Weakness enumerations
- Our research efforts:
  - Building **semantic templates** to understand and categorize the information related to a vulnerability
- Ongoing progress
- Future work

The Paradox we face !



Large Software Repositories

- Source code version control systems (CVS, SVN)
  - Support distributed development
  - Versioning, Merging and Backup functions
  - Huge!
- Log of changes
  - Brief descriptions of the change performed
  - who, when, what, why
- IDEs, Bug tracker databases (reporters, resolvers, discussions), Public websites
- Mailing list threads related to the changes
  - Stakeholders: Developers, Organizations

Vulnerability Databases

- Several databases available
  - IBM X-force
  - CERIAS
  - CERT
  - DARPA CIDF
  - BindView Hacker Shield
  - Many others…
- Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE)
  - 42976 Vulnerabilities as of 2010-07-21 09:22 CST

Learning from our mistakes

- The Landwehr Software Flaw Taxonomy (1993)
  - Genesis (How), Time of introduction (When), Location (Where)
- Several recent efforts have followed
  - Seven Pernicious Kingdoms, PLOVER, 19 Deadly Sins, OWASP top ten…
- The Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) has tried to assimilate these efforts and bring consensus (http://cwe.mitre.org)

Building CWE & Consensus



Source: cwe.mitre.org

CWE Organization (rough)



Weakness Enumerations

- Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE)
  - (**measurement**) Unified, measurable set of software weaknesses
  - (**communication**) Effective sharing, description, selection, and use of software security tools and services
  - (**management, prioritization**) Better understanding and management of software weaknesses related to design and code

Problems, Problems, Problems…

- Most vulnerability related artifacts are in unstructured text
  - Makes aggregation of these artifacts harder
- No shortage of weakness enumerations and categorization
  - Adoption in projects is slow
    - many choices could be a factor
- Growing software complexity
  - Little or no effort to improve the mental model of the software developer to sense the possibility of a vulnerability

Reducing the Cognitive Overload

- Devil is in the Details
  - The details about vulnerabilities are enormous during the coding phases
- Simple guides can be more effective than a long checklist
  - The 3 golden questions to ask about each bug (1989)
    - Is this mistake somewhere else also?
    - What next bug is hidden behind this one?
    - What should I do to prevent bugs like this?

Reducing the Cognitive Overload

- Questions about security weaknesses
  - What are the **Software flaws** (commission, omission, operational) that lead to the weakness?
  - What are the defining characteristics of the **Weakness**?
  - What are the ***Resources***/***Location*** where the weakness is typically manifest?
  - What are the **Consequences** that the weakness precedes?

Tangling of information in the CWE

- **CWE-119: Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a *Memory Buffer***
  - The software performs operations on a ***memory buffer***, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the ***buffer***.
  - Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data. As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.

Tangling of information in the CWE

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LEGEND

Software Fault

Weakness

Resource/Location

Consequence

Tangling of information in the CWE

- CWE-120: ***Buffer*** **Copy without Checking Size of Input** ('Classic **Buffer Overflow**')
  - The program copies an input ***buffer*** to an output ***buffer*** without verifying that the size of the input ***buffer*** is less than the size of the output ***buffer***, leading to a **buffer overflow**.
  - A **buffer overflow** condition exists when a program attempts to put more data in a ***buffer*** than it can hold, or when a program attempts to put data in a ***memory area*** outside of the boundaries of a ***buffer***.
  - **Buffer overflows** often can be used to **execute arbitrary code**…
  - **Buffer overflows** generally **lead to crashes**

LEGEND

Software Fault

Weakness

Resource/Location

Consequence

UnTangling


SOFTWARE-FAULT
BUFFER COPY WITHOUT CHECKING SIZE OF INPUT #120
CAN-PRECEDE
WEAKNESS
ACCESS AND OUT-OF-BOUNDS READ #125, #126, #127, #786
ACCESS AND OUT-OF-BOUNDS WRITE #787, #788, #124
IS-A
IS-A
FAILURE TO CONSTRAIN OPERATIONS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF A MEMORY BUFFER #119
OCCURS-IN
RESOURCE/LOCATION
MEMORY-BUFFER #119
IS-A
BUFFER #119
PART-OF
INDEXABLE-RESOURCE #118
CAN-PRECEDE
CONSEQUENCES
WRITE-WHAT-WHERE CONDITION #123

Building a Semantic Template

- For each weakness type create a semantic template

CE **Concept Extraction**

- Exploration of the CWE structure to extract entries relevant to a weakness

TS **Template structuring**

- Software Fault, Weakness, Resources, Consequences

TR **Template refinement**

- Aggregation of Vulnerability Artifacts
- Annotation using Semantic template concepts

Concept Extraction

- CWE 1.6
- Development view
  - Suited for stakeholders in the SDLC
- Research view
  - Suited for research using the cwe; deep hierarchical structure
- Select a “Root entry”
  - CWE that provides the most abstract description of a weakness, that would be CWE 119 for BO

Concept Extraction

- Strategies:
  1. Navigate hierarchical relationships of the root entry
  2. Navigate non-taxonomical relationships such as “Can Precede”, “Can Follow”, “Peer-of”
  3. Visualization of the CWE XML specification
     - A graph is generated using graphviz
  4. Keyword search on the CWE hyperlinked document
     - Followed by exploration of parent, sibling and child categories of the discovered CWE, for relevance to the root entry

Visualization



http://www.cs.unomaha.edu/~hsiy/research/zgrview/boverflowCWEs.html

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Concept Extraction

CE TS TR



Template Structuring

- Each CWE identified in the previous step is analyzed for concepts along the conceptual unit of the semantic template
- Relationships among the CWE entries are then used to structure the identified concepts into a coherent semantic template

- CWE-120: ***Buffer*** **Copy without Checking Size of Input** ('Classic **Buffer Overflow**')
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  - A **buffer overflow** condition exists when a program attempts to put more data in a ***buffer*** than it can hold, or when a program attempts to put data in a ***memory area*** outside of the boundaries of a ***buffer***.
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Buffer Overflow

CE TS TR



Apache HTTP Server

- Widely used web server
- Open Source project with a large software repository readily available
- Due to the project size and its complexity, various vulnerabilities have occurred and solved during its lifetime

CVE (CAN-2004-0492)

- National Vulnerability Database **(Vulnerability Database)** http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2004-0492
  - **Heap-based buffer overflow** in **proxy_util.c** for **mod_proxy** in **Apache 1.3.25 to 1.3.31** allows remote attackers to cause **a denial of service (process crash)** and possibly **execute arbitrary code via a negative Content-Length HTTP header field**, which causes a large amount of data to be copied.
- Apache Security Reports **(Public website)**
- http://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_13.html
  - A **buffer overflow** was found in the **Apache proxy module, mod_proxy**, which can be triggered by receiving an **invalid Content-Length header**. In order to exploit this issue an attacker would need to get an Apache installation that was configured as a proxy to connect to a malicious site. This would cause the Apache child processing the request to crash, although this does not represent a significant Denial of Service attack as requests will continue to be handled by other Apache child processes. This issue may lead to remote arbitrary code execution on some BSD platforms.

Apache Log of Changes(Fix)

Files Fixed in Project:

Roles

http://marc.info/?l=apache-cvs&m=108694047031937&q=raw

```
mjc         2004/06/11 00:54:38

Modified:    src       CHANGES
             src/modules/proxy proxy_http.c
Log:
Receiving a negative content length from a remote server can cause
a buffer overflow in later code; reject connection if we receive an invalid
header.  CAN-2004-0492
Submitted by: Mark Cox
Reviewed by: Joe Orton, Bill Stoddard, Jim Jagielski

Revision  Changes    Path
1.1943    +4 -0      apache-1.3/src/CHANGES

Index: CHANGES
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvs/apache-1.3/src/CHANGES,v
retrieving revision 1.1942
retrieving revision 1.1943
diff -u -r1.1942 -r1.1943
--- CHANGES   2 Jun 2004 22:49:03 -0000       1.1942
+++ CHANGES   11 Jun 2004 07:54:38 -0000      1.1943
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 Changes with Apache 1.3.32

+  *) SECURITY: CAN-2004-0492 (cve.mitre.org)
+     Reject responses from a remote server if sent an invalid (negative)
+     Content-Length.  [Mark Cox]
+
    *) Fix a bunch of cases where the return code of the regex compiler
       was not checked properly. This affects mod_usertrack and
       core. PR 28218.  [André Malo]



1.107     +7 -0      apache-1.3/src/modules/proxy/proxy_http.c
```

Fix time

Source Code Differences

#	revision 103191, Mon Mar 29 17:47:15 2004 UTC	revision 103896, Fri Jun 11 07:54:38 2004 UTC
	Line 485 int ap_proxy_http_handler(request_rec *r	**Line 485** int ap_proxy_http_handler(request_rec *r
485	content_length = ap_table_get(resp_hdrs, "Content-Length");	content_length = ap_table_get(resp_hdrs, "Content-Length");
486	if (content_length != NULL) {	if (content_length != NULL) {
487	c->len = ap_strtol(content_length, NULL, 10);	c->len = ap_strtol(content_length, NULL, 10);
488		
489		if (c->len < 0) {
490		ap_kill_timeout(r);
491		return ap_proxyerror(r, HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY, ap_pstrcat(r->pool,
492		"Invalid Content-Length from remote server",
493		NULL));
494		}
495	}	}
496		
497	}	}

Study of the Vulnerability



CE TS TR

Study of the Vulnerability






INCORRECT-BUFFER-SIZE-CALCULATION #131
IMPROPER-INPUT-VALIDATION #20
CVE : ….possibly execute arbitrary code via a negative Content-Length HTTP header field…
Apache Website: buffer overflow ….can be triggered by receiving an invalid Content-Length header
Source Code: Added validation criteria to avoid negative input
if (c->len < 0) {
WEAKNESS
CAN-PRECEDE
2
CVE : …. causes a large amount of data to be copied …
Apache Website: This issue may lead to remote arbitrary code execution on some BSD platforms…
ACCESS AND OUT-OF-BOUNDS WRITE #787, #788, #124
IS-A
BOUNDS OF A MEMORY BUFFER #119
IS-A
OCCURS-IN
STACK-BASED #121
IS-A

te arbitrary code via **a negative Content-eld**…

er overflow ….can be triggered by **tent-Length header**

validation criteria to **avoid negative input**
`c->len < 0) {`

RETURN OF POINTER OUTSIDE OF TED RANGE #466

API ABUSE #227

FUNCTIONS #242

IMPROPER NULL TERMINATION #170

IMPROPER USE FREED MEMORY #415 #416

ING OF ETER CY

IMPROPER VALIDATION OF ARRAY INDEX #129 #789

BUFFER COPY WITHOUT CHECKING SIZE OF INPUT ('CLASSIC BUFFER OVERFLOW') #120

RECEDE

CAN-PRECEDE

OCCURS-IN

RESOURCE/LOCATION

STACK-BASED #121

STATIC #129

HEAP-BASED #122

IS-A

IS-A

IS-A

MEMORY-BUFFER #119

IS-A

BUFFER #119

3

CVE : Heap-based buffer overflow in proxy_util.c for mod_proxy in Apache 1.3.25 to 1.3.31…

Apache Website: A **buffer** overflow was found in the Apache proxy module, mod_proxy …

Apache Change History:… buffer overflow in later code…

CONSEQUENCES

4

CVE : allows remote attackers to cause a

#129 #789

#120

CAN-PRECEDE

CEDE

OCCURS-IN



3

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Apache Website: A **buffer** overflow was found in the Apache proxy module, mod_proxy …

Apache Change History:… buffer overflow in later code…

CONSEQUENCES

4

WRITE-WHAT-WHERE
CONDITION
#123

CVE : allows remote attackers to cause a **denial of service** (process crash) and possibly **execute arbitrary code**

Apache Website: cause the Apache **child processing the request to crash** … This issue may lead to **remote arbitrary code execution** on some BSD platforms

CAN-PRECEDE

Ontology Representation

- Semantic web based representation
  - Allow inferences and queries over a large collection of semantically annotated vulnerability artifacts
  - Examples
    - "Show past vulnerabilities that related to **buffer overflow weaknesses** that precedes **arbitrary code execution**"
    - "Which **software fault** most often precedes the **buffer overflow weaknesses**?"

Semantic Web Visualization



Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (**CAPEC**)

- A shared indexing standard for common attacks patterns used in exploits or malware
- Attack patterns
  - Capture and communicate an attackers perspective
    - Common vocabulary to express attack vectors
  - List of common methods to exploit vulnerabilities
  - A “destructive” way of thinking
    - Know your enemy. Defense alone is not enough.
- http://capec.mitre.org/

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CAPEC Example

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
A Community Knowledge Resource for Building Secure Software

Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers (Release 1.5)

Search by ID: Go

CAPEC List
Full CAPEC Dictionary
Methods of Attack View
Reports
About CAPEC
Documents
Resources
Community
Related Activities
Collaboration List
News & Events
Calendar
Free Newsletter
Contact Us
Search the Site

CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers

Overflow Buffers

Attack Pattern ID: 100 *(Standard Attack Pattern Completeness: Complete)*

Typical Severity: Very High

Status: Draft

Description

Summary

Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an attacker. As a consequence, an attacker is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the attacker's choice.

Attack Execution Flow

1. The attacker identifies a buffer to target. Buffer regions are either allotted on the stack or the heap, and the exact nature of attack would vary depending on the location of the buffer
2. Next, the attacker identifies an injection vector to deliver the excessive content to the targeted buffer.
3. The attacker crafts the content to be injected. If the intent is to simply cause the software to crash, the content need only consist of an excessive quantity of random data. If the intent is to leverage the overflow for execution of arbitrary code, the attacker will craft a set of content that not only overflows the targeted buffer but does so in such a way that the overwritten return address is replaced with one of the attacker's choosing which points to code injected by the attacker.
4. The attacker injects the content into the targeted software.
5. Upon successful exploitation, the system either crashes or control of the program is returned to a location of the attacker's choice. This can result in execution of arbitrary code or escalated privileges, depending upon the exploited target.

Attack Prerequisites

Targeted software performs buffer operations.

Targeted software inadequately performs bounds-checking on buffer operations.

Attacker has the capability to influence the input to buffer operations.

Ongoing Work (Injection Template)



Ongoing Work (Injection Template)

Apache Website CVE-2007-5000 :
….a cross-site scripting attack is possible….

NVD CVE-2007-5000: a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the ….mod_imap module….

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation: Fix cross-site-scripting issue by escaping the URI…

Source Code Repository Code Difference:

```
File: mod_imagemap.c
Line 485 and 490 modified to escape html in URI:
ap_escape_html(r->pool, r->uri)
```

CAPEC-63: Simple Script Injection:
(Experimentation) Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by the application
(Exploit) Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation:
….ensure that a charset parameter is sent in the content-type …

Source Code Repository Code Difference:

```
File: mod_imagemap.c
Line 482 modified to contain an explicit character set:
ap_set_content_type(r, "text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1");
```

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers:
(Experimentation) Determine which character encodings are accepted by the application/system:
(Exploit) Perform XSS attacks



CAN-PRECEDE

WEAKNESS

3

Apache Website CVE-2007-5000 : ….a cross-site scripting attack is possible….

NVD CVE-2007-5000 : allows

RESOURCE/I

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation: Fix cross-site-scripting issue escaping the URI…

Source Code Repository Code Differen

```
File: mod_imagemap.c
```

Ongoing Work (Injection Template)

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation:
….ensure that a charset parameter is sent in the content-type …

Source Code Repository Code Difference:

```
File: mod_imagemap.c
Line 482 modified to contain an explicit character set:
ap_set_content_type(r, "text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1");
```

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers:
(Experimentation) Determine which character encodings are accepted by the application/system:
(Exploit) Perform XSS attacks

2



Website CVE-2007-
La cross-site scripting
ossible….

E-2007-5000 : allows
ackers to **inject**…

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation: Fix cross-site-scripting issue by escaping the URI…

4

Source Code Repository Code Difference:

```
File: mod_imagemap.c
```



ap_escape_html(r->pool, r->uri)

CAPEC-63: Simple Script Injection:
(Experimentation) Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by the application
(Exploit) Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the Experiment Phase

1

FAILURE TO PRESERVE GENERATED WEB PAGE STRUCTURE #79-87 #113 #442 #692 #644

FAILURE TO SANITIZE USER INPUT OF SYNTAX THAT HAS IMPLICATIONS IN A DIFFERENT PLANE #74 #94 #99 #138

IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF MESSAGE OR DATA STRUCTURE #707

IMPROPER-INPUT-VALIDATION #20 #554

IS-A

IMPROPER SANITIZATION OF SPECIAL ELEMENTS #138 #75 #140-169

IMPROPER COLLAPSING OF PATH NAMES #182

MISSING INITIALIZATION #456

INCOMPELTE BLACKLIST #184

CAN-PRECEDE

WEAKNESS

ELEMENTS OF USER-CONTROLLED DATA HAVE IMPLICATIONS IN A DIFFERENT PLANE #74

3

Apache Website CVE-2007-5000 : ….a cross-site scripting attack is possible….

NVD CVE-2007-5000 : allows remote attackers to **inject**…

OCCURS-IN

RESOURCE/

Source Code Repository developer fix documentation: Fix cross-site-scripting issue by escaping the URI…

Source Code Repository Code Difference

File: mod_imagemap.c
Line 485 and 490 modified to escape htm in URI:
ap_escape_html(r->pool, r->uri)

OS COMMANDS /SHELL #78

EXECUTABLE REGULAR EXPRESSION #624

QUERY

COMMAND #77

FORMAT STRING # 134

RESOURCE IDENTIFIERS #99

GENERATED CODE #94

USER-CONTROLLED INPUT DATA #74

CAN-PRECEDE

CONSEQUENCES

EXECUTION OF ARBITRARY USER-CONTROLLED DATA #20 #74 #77 #94

CHANGE PROCESS FLOW #74

UNAUTHORIZED DATA RECALL AND WRITING #74 #77 #93 #94

EXCESSIVE CONSUMPTION OF RESOURCES OR CRASH #20

UNACCOUNTED ACTIONS #74 #94

CONTROL OF AUTHENTICATION #74 #94

5

NVD CVE-2007-5000 :
…..allows remote attackers to **inject arbitrary web script or HTML**….

6

NVD CVSS CVE-2007-5000 impact type : Allows unauthorized modification


CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers:
(Experimentation) Determine which character encodings are accepted by the application/system:
(Exploit) Perform XSS attacks
1
FAILURE TO PRESERVE GENERATED WEB PAGE STRUCTURE #79-87 #113 #442 #692 #644
FAILURE TO SANITIZE USER INPUT OF SYNTAX THAT HAS IMPLICATIONS IN A DIFFERENT PLANE #74 #94 #99 #138
IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF MESSAGE OR DATA STRUCTURE #707
IMPROPER-INPUT-VALIDATION #20 #554
IMPROPER SANITIZATION OF SPECIAL ELEMENTS #138 #75 #140-169
INCOMPELTE BLACKLIST #184
PERMISSIVE WHITELIST #183
INCORRECT REGULAR EXPRESSION #185 #186
IMPROPER COLLAPSING OF PATH NAMES #182
VALIDATING DATA BEFORE CANONICALIZING OR FILTERING #179 #180 #181
MISSING INITIALIZATION #456
IMPROPER CLEANSING AND CANONICALIZATION #171
IS-A
Apache Website CVE-2007-5000 : ….a cross-site scripting attack is possible….
NVD CVE-2007-5000 : allows remote attackers to inject…
OCCURS-IN
CAN-PRECEDE
Source Code Repository developer fix documentation: Fix cross-site-scripting issue by escaping the URI…
Source Code Repository Code Difference:
File: mod_imagemap.c
Line 485 and 490 modified to escape html in URI:
ap_escape_html(r->pool, r->uri)
4
URI #84
ERROR PAGE #81
INPUT FIELDS, HIDDEN FIELDS & ATTRIBUTES #80 #82 #83 #85 #87
IDENTIFIERS #86
COOKIES #565
WEB PAGE #79
WEB RESOURCES #442
USER-CONTROLLED INPUT DATA #74
OS COMMANDS /SHELL #78
QUERY
RESOURCE IDENTIFIERS #99
EXECUTABLE REGULAR EXPRESSION #624
COMMAND #77
GENERATED CODE #94
FORMAT STRING # 134
PART-OF
EXECUTION OF ARBITRARY USER-CONTROLLED DATA #20 #74 #77 #94
CHANGE PROCESS FLOW #74
UNAUTHORIZED DATA RECALL AND WRITING #74 #77 #93 #94
6
NVD CVSS CVE-2007-5000 impact type : Allows unauthorized modification
EXCESSIVE CONSUMPTION OF RESOURCES OR CRASH #20
CONTROL OF AUTHENTICATION #74 #94

Future Work

- Integrate with existing static and dynamic analysis tools to enhance reporting capabilities
  - Provide layers of guidance to a developer upon detection of a software flaw
  - Organize and retrieve knowledge of past vulnerabilities
  - Verify patch submissions
- Investigate project/developer specific coding errors and vulnerability fix patterns
- Other usage scenarios in the SDLC

Some take aways…

- Ask Johnny (or your software vendor):
  - *How many CWEs have you attempted to explicitly avoid in your software?*
  - *What CWEs can our Threats take advantage of?*
    - *I want you to build a shopping cart, while avoiding those CWEs…*
  - *What CAPECs do your testing efforts map to?*
  - *What CWEs do the vulnerabilities in your code typically map to? Have you taken any training for them?*
    - *Have you looked at the semantic templates by being developed at UNO/NUCIA for those CWEs?*
      - *http://faculty.ist.unomaha.edu/rgandhi/st/*

CERT Secure Coding Guidelines

https://www.securecoding.cert.org/



CERT C Secure Coding Standard

- 00. Introduction
- 01. Preprocessor (PRE)
- 02. Declarations and Initialization (DCL)
- 03. Expressions (EXP)
- 04. Integers (INT)
- 05. Floating Point (FLP)
- 06. Arrays (ARR)
- 07. Characters and Strings (STR)
- 08. Memory Management (MEM)
- 09. Input Output (FIO)
- 10. Environment (ENV)
- 11. Signals (SIG)
- 12. Error Handling (ERR)
- 13. Application Programming Interfaces (API)
- 14. Concurrency (CON)
- 49. Miscellaneous (MSC)
- 50. POSIX (POS)
- AA. Bibliography
- BB. Definitions
- CC. Undefined Behavior
- DD. Unspecified Behavior

Acknowledgement

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Thank you for your Attention