Process Capability for Information Assurance: Security Engineering Practices for Better Bottom-Line Results



Matt O'Brien, CISSP obrienma@saic.com

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Objectives

- Importance of Process Capability for Information Assurance
- Overview of the Systems Security Engineering CMM
 - Not a substitute for reading Model Description Document
- Essential Elements of Security Engineering Process
 - Proposal that complements system development lifecycle
- Examples of Security Engineering Practices
 - Example implementations





Process Capability: The Investing Analogy

- Process capability is analogous to a Buy-and-Hold investment strategy
 - Not a "get rich quick" scheme (process capability built over time)
 - Stock selection based upon analysis (rigor of engineering discipline)
 - Portfolio management to measure performance (performance parameters enable "best of breed" determination and on-going enhancements)



- Success is dependent upon constancy
 - No "timing the market" (threat is not predictable)





Process Capability: The Argument

Assertions

- Process is an essential element of the assurance argument (more important than product)
- Process must be organized around specific activities (e.g., system development lifecycle)
- Process must have measures of evaluation (e.g., key performance parameters)

Desired Outcome

 Process with measurable outputs that enables "best of breed" to be identified and widely adopted





Process Capability: The Imperative


- A single vulnerability can compromise a system as thoroughly as if it had no benefit of security engineering
- Process capability is a defense-in-depth mechanism to combat this ubiquitous threat
 - Prevent ("Protect")
 - Identify ("Detect")
 - Remedy ("React")
- Process capability determines and sustains the robustness of an enterprise's security posture
 - Assessment-type activities (e.g., penetration testing, security test and evaluation) are only point-in-time snapshots





SSE-CMM Overview

SSE-CMM Security Engineering Process Elements





http://www.sse-cmm.org



Model Architecture

- Security Engineering Base Practices
 - Represent best practices
 - Iterative, and not ordered by lifecycle phase
- Project and Organizational Base Practices
 - Adapted from Systems Engineering CMM
 - Reference materials for interpreting generic practices
- Capability Levels (Generic Practices)
 - Management, measurement and institutionalization aspects
 - Assess and improve organization's process capability
 - Rank ordered according to maturity





Security Engineering Base Practices

- Base practices are grouped into 11 process areas:
 - PA01 Administer Security Controls
 - PA02 Assess Impact
 - PA03 Assess Security Risk
 - PA04 Assess Threat
 - PA05 Assess Vulnerability
 - PA06 Build Assurance Argument
 - PA07 Coordinate Security
 - PA08 Monitor Security Posture
 - PA09 Provide Security Input
 - PA10 Specify Security Needs
 - PA11 Verify and Validate Security





Project and Organizational Base Practices

- Base practices are grouped into 11 process areas:
 - PA12 Ensure Quality
 - PA13 Manage Configuration
 - PA14 Manage Project Risk
 - PA15 Monitor and Control Technical Effort
 - PA16 Plan Technical Effort
 - PA17 Define Organization's Systems Eng Process
 - PA18 Improve Organization's Sys Eng Process
 - PA19 Manage Product Line Evolution
 - PA20 Manage Sys Eng Support Environment
 - PA21 Provide Ongoing Skills and Knowledge
 - PA22 Coordinate with Suppliers





PA01 – Process Area Title (in verb-noun form)


Summary Description – An overview of the process area Goals – A list indicating the desired results of implementing this process area Base Practices List – A list showing the number and name of each base practice Process Area Notes – Any other notes about this process area

BP.01.01 - Base Practice Title (in verb-noun form)

Descriptive Name – A sentence describing the base practice Description – An overview of this base practice Example Work Products – A list of examples illustrating some possible output Notes – Any other notes about this base practice

BP.01.02... BP.01.03...

Security Engineering Base Practices








Capability Levels

Represent the maturity of the security engineering organization








Capability-Based Assurance

 Assurance mechanisms provide confidence that security requirements have been satisfied




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
Determining Organizational Capability







- The National Security Agency has developed an INFOSEC Assessment Training and Rating Program
 - INFOSEC Assessment CMM based upon SSE-CMM
 - Provides standard evaluation of vendors' INFOSEC vulnerability assessment capabilities
 - 7 firms have had appraisal





http://www.iatrp.com/main.cfm



- IA-CMM has 9 process areas
 - Focuses on the processes that produce products (e.g., identified vulnerabilities, countermeasures and threats)
 - Uses standard CMM capability levels to rate maturity







Limitations of the SSE-CMM for Process Capability

- Model is not prescriptive
 - Emphasizes "what to do", not "how to do"
 - Specifically avoids defining sequence for activities
- Model definition of risk is simplistic
 - Threat \rightarrow Vulnerability \rightarrow Impact
- Model does not appear to be widely used
 - A de facto standard would promote common terminology, definition of problem space/solutions





A Significant Advancement for Process Capability

Information Assurance Technical Framework Forum

- NSA-sponsored IATF document (Release 3.1, Sep 2002)
 - Information Systems Security Engineering process consisting of 6 activities
 - Discover Information Protection Needs
 - ✓ Define System Security Requirements
 - ✓ Define System Security Architecture
 - ✓ Develop Detailed Security Design
 - Implement System Security
 - Assess Information Protection Effectiveness
 - Master Activity and Task List to decomposes ISSE process activities into tasks and subtasks



- ✓ Two program management activities are included
- ISSE Process is related to Systems Engineering Process
- ISSE Process is related to DoD's certification and accreditation process (DITSCAP)





- Proposed 10 elements:
 - Security Policy and Requirements
 - Certification and Accreditation Plan
 - Security Architecture and Implementation Plan
 - Security Configuration Baseline Development
 - Security Documentation
 - Security Test and Evaluation
 - Vulnerability Identification and Patch Process
 - Host and Network Intrusion Detection Plan
 - Security Monitoring
 - Periodic Evaluation of Countermeasures

Requirements Definition Design & Development

Implementation

Operations & Maintenance System Development Lifecycle





Security Policy and Requirements

- Assigns roles and responsibilities
 - Who's in charge?
 - Organizational structure to accomplish policy
- Defines what is to be protected (and possibly how)
 - Scope and applicability
 - Exceptions and adjudication
- Defines reporting requirements to evaluate progress
 - Frequency

"Measurement Improves Performance"

Success criteria

Requirements Definition





Security Policy and Requirements (2)

- Policy can be at organizational and/or system level
 - Example: DoD's Information Assurance Policy (DoDD 8500.1: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/)
- Requirements, at system level, support assurance argument for system certification and accreditation
 - System requirements
 - Process requirements
- Standard requirements promote understanding
 - Example: Common Criteria requirements catalog *
 - Protection Profiles specify product-based requirements

Requirements Definition Example: Protection Profiles at http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/protection_profiles/





Certification and Accreditation Plan

- Certification and accreditation is a risk management process for approval and operation of a system
 - Defines activities and milestones for security engineering process to support accreditation
- DoD process ("DITSCAP") is formally defined at policy and implementation levels
 - Policy: DoDI 5200.40 *
 - Implementation: DoD 8510.1-M *
- Assessment of risk, and assumption of residual risk, remain subjective decisions within DoD



Requirements Definition

Implication for community risk





Certification and Accreditation Plan (2)

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	
Definition Analyze or	Verification Analyze	Validation Certification Accre	Post-Accreditation ditation	
Develop Mission	- System Architecture	- ST&E Dec	cision	
Needs	- Software Design - Network Connection	- TEMPEST & Red/Black	Maintain Accreditation	DITSCAP
Develop SSAA	- Product Integrity - Life Cycle	- COMSEC Compliance - Sys Mgmt Analysis	Ongoing Maintenance	Phases
Registration	Management	 Site Accred. Survey Contingency Plan 	System Operation	
Negotiation	Assess Vulnerability	- Risk Management	Change Management	
	Assess Analysis Results	Certifier's Recommend. Accreditation Decision	Compliance Validation	
Requirements Definition	Design & Development	Implementation	Operations & Maintenance	System Development Lifecycle

Requirements Definition





Security Architecture and Implementation Plan

- Security architecture is dependent upon system arch.
 - Functional architecture may initially suffice
 - Ultimately technical architecture is needed
 - Functional decomposition to define technical architecture
- Security architecture may be dictated by regulatory environment/system type
 - Health care systems: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act security provisions
 - DoD classified system: DoDI 8500.2, IA Implementation
 - Federal IA-related products: NSTISSP No. 11 *
- Operating environment/characteristics

Requirements Definition Information Assurance Technical Framework (http://www.iatf.net/framework_docs/version-3_1/index.cfm)



* http://niap.nist.gov/niap/library/nstissp_11.pdf



Security Architecture and Implementation Plan (2)

- System connections/interfaces and data flows
 - Reliance upon external systems (e.g., PKI)
- Security architecture requirements traceability
 - Technical requirements
 - Configuration (e.g., OS, application server)
 - NSA security recommendation guides *
 - Security products/tools
 - Process requirements
 - Developer/IAO (ISSO)/user
 - Documentation requirements
 - Developer guidance, IAO (ISSO)/user documents
- System security roles and responsibilities
 - Security monitoring: IAO (ISSO)

Requirements Definition



* http://www.nsa.gov/snac/index.html



Security Configuration Baseline Development

- Informally described as the "lockdown"
- Hardware components
 - Security products (e.g., firewalls)
 - Security appliances (e.g, VPN)
- Software components
 - Security tools (e.g., anti-virus)
- Software configuration
 - Security and non-security related (OS and applications)







Security Documentation

- Product of integration testing of security lockdown
- Lockdown invariably involves functional trade-offs
- Security configuration baseline document
 - Captures functional trade-offs/waivers
 - Details hardware/software/configuration settings
 - > Often several hundred pages
 - CM, version-controlled document
- IAO (ISSO)/user documentation
 - Examples: Security CONOPS/TFM, SFUG, training docs

Implementation





- Configuration management is prerequisite of ST&E and maintenance of system security posture
- Functional testing of security services
 - Prior agreement regarding success criteria (e.g., no priority 1 findings for IATO/ATO) and timelines
 - Traceability to requirements
- Execution of back-up and recovery procedures
 - Off-site storage of back-up media
- Review of security documentation
- Evaluation of residual risk

Implementation





Security Test and Evaluation (2)

Priority	IEEE Std 1044	COE Priority Logic	Security Priority Logic:
1	a) Prevent the accomplishment of an essential capability.b) Jeopardize safety, security, or other requirement designated "critical".	Unable to perform required operational capability (vital software core dumps), Y2K execution issue that requires more than exiting and restarting application.	 a) Exploit affects a large number of hosts in their standard configuration or the underlying infrastructure. b) Exploit is executable from a remote location. c) Exploit has significant impact (e.g., denial of service, root compromise). d) Exploit code is available and currently being used to exploit systems.
2	 a) Adversely affect the accomplishment of an essential capability and no work- around solution is known. b) Adversely affect technical, cost, schedule risks to the project or to the life cycle support of the system, and no work- around solution is known. 	Required operational capability is adversely affected and no work-around is available (vital software doesn't work and there is no work-around); Y2K display issue or execution issue that can be fixed by exiting and restarting application.	a) Exploit affects a large number of hosts in their standard configuration or the underlying infrastructure.b) Exploit has significant impact (e.g., denial of service, root compromise).
3	 a) Adversely affect the accomplishment of an essential capability but a work-around solution is known. b) Adversely affect technical, cost, schedule risks to the project or to the life cycle support of the system, but a work-around solution is known. 	Required operational capability is adversely affected and work-around available (vital software doesn't work and there is work-around); KPC test procedure issue that reveals a major problem in operational software, support capability and there is no work-around available (check compliance).	a) Exploit affects a large number of hosts in their standard configuration or the underlying infrastructure.b) Exploit adversely affects the accomplishment of an essential capability (e.g., unauthorized ability to modify data).
4	 a) Result in user/operator inconvenience or annoyance but does not affect a required operational or mission-essential capability. b) Result in inconvenience or annoyance for development or maintenance personnel but does not prevent the accomplishment of the responsibilities of those personnel. 	Operator or user inconvenience; compliance and documentation issues that affect users or administrators; KPC test procedure issue that does not reveal a major problem in operational software, support capability and there is work- around (check compliance)	N/A
5	Any other effect.	Comp <mark>liance and documentation issues</mark> that do not affect users or administrators	N/A



Vulnerabilities Are Prioritized According to System Impact



Host and Network Intrusion Detection Plan


- System design phase will select and cost host and network intrusion detection products/tools
- Intrusion detection products/tools/processes are intended to protect against and respond to penetrations (i.e., defense-in-depth capability)
- Host-based products/tools may include malicious code protection (e.g., anti-virus) and integritychecking tools (e.g., Tripwire)
- Patch process is essential element for O&M
 - Example: NIAP Assurance Maintenance Program *

Implementation





Host and Network Intrusion Detection Plan (2)





Security Monitoring

- Security monitoring
 - Ensures compliance with security requirements
 - Including process requirements
 - Provides assurance regarding security posture
- Conduct audit/process reviews, respond to incident reports and release security patches
- Security monitoring is ideal for process metrics collection and evaluation
 - Initial: binary—performed/not performed
 - Interim: process efficiency and problem/trend analysis
 - Final: increase robustness in problem areas (product or process)







Security Monitoring (2)

- Security requirements are designed to address three principal types of vulnerabilities:
 - Inherent (e.g., remote login service—no authentication)
 - Strength-of-mechanism (e.g., password construction)
 - Defective engineering (e.g., buffer overflow condition)
- Defective engineering vulnerabilities are addressed throughout system operation
 - Commercial-off-the-shelf operating systems and apps.
 - Custom/proprietary applications





Security Monitoring (3)

Vulnerability Patch Process Metrics December 2002

Initial Response Time

- Elapsed calendar days from receipt of DoD IAVA to issuance of Course of Action (COA) report
- Target time is 2 calendar days
- Metric is only applicable to DoD-generated IAVAs (vice COE-generated vulnerability notices)
- Priority Code (Pri): R = Routine, P = Priority, C = Critical

Pri	IAVA Receipt	COA Issue	Calendar Days
С	12/04/02	11/20/02	-14
С	12/13/02	12/11/02	-2
Р	12/16/02	12/5/02	-11
R	12/19/02	12/20/02	1
		erations & intenance	
	C C P	C 12/04/02 C 12/13/02 P 12/16/02	С 12/04/02 11/20/02 С 12/13/02 12/11/02 Р 12/16/02 12/5/02 R 12/19/02 12/20/02

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Periodic Evaluation of Countermeasures

- Review of system architecture/operation
- Review of security incident reports
- Review of security vulnerabilities identified through patch process
- Review of security products/tools
- Review of process metrics







- IA process capability is a defense-in-depth mechanism to sustain an enterprise's security posture
- Process elements continue to be refined to reflect
 - System development/systems engineering activities
 - Operational environment/characteristics (e.g., DoD)
 - Process maturity: "The maturity of the discipline is defined by the robustness of its processes"
- Security engineering practices are becoming sufficiently robust to collect and evaluate metrics
 - Robustness is a topic of considerable interest *
- Identification and collection of "best of breed" practices will enable widespread adoption







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Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) Project

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Back-up Slides





Capability Dimension Overview

Capability Level 1 – Performed Informally

Common Feature 1.1 – Base Practices Are Performed

Capability Level 2 – Planned and Tracked

Common Feature 2.1 – Planning Performance Common Feature 2.2 – Disciplined Performance Common Feature 2.3 – Verifying Performance Common Feature 2.4 – Tracking Performance

Capability Level 3 – Well Defined

Common Feature 3.1 – Defining a Standard Process Common Feature 3.2 – Perform the Defined Process Common Feature 3.3 – Coordinate Practices





Capability Dimension Overview (2)

Capability Level 4 – Quantitatively Controlled

Common Feature 4.1 – Establishing Measurable Quality Goals Common Feature 4.2 – Objectively Managing Performance

Capability Level 5 – Continuously Improving

Common Feature 5.1 – Improving Organizational Capability Common Feature 5.2 – Improving Process Effectiveness





Goal 1 Security controls are properly configured and used.

BP.01.01 Establish responsibilities and accountability for security controls and communicate them to everyone in the organization.

BP.01.02 Manage the configuration of system security controls.

BP.01.03 Manage security awareness, training, and education programs for all users and administrators.

BP.01.04 Manage periodic maintenance and administration of security services and control mechanisms.





PA02: Assess Impact

Goal 1 The security impacts of risks to the system are identified and characterized.

BP.02.01 Identify, analyze, and prioritize operational, business, or mission capabilities leveraged by the system.

BP.02.02 Identify and characterize the system assets that support the key operational capabilities or the security objectives of the system.

BP.02.03 Select the impact metric to be used for this assessment.

BP.02.04 Identify the relationship between the selected metrics for this assessment and metric conversion factors if required.

BP.02.05 Identify and characterize impacts.

BP.02.06 Monitor ongoing changes in the impacts.





PA03: Assess Security Risk

Goal 1 An understanding of the security risk associated with operating the system within a defined environment is achieved.

Goal 2 Risks are prioritized according to a defined methodology.

BP.03.01 Select the methods, techniques, and criteria by which security risks, for the system in a defined environment are analyzed, assessed, and compared.

BP.03.02 Identify threat/vulnerability/impact triples (exposures).

BP.03.03 Assess the risk associated with the occurrence of an exposure.

BP.03.04 Assess the total uncertainty associated with the risk for the exposure.

BP.03.05 Order risks by priority.

BP.03.06 Monitor ongoing changes in the risk spectrum and changes to their characteristics.





Goal 1 Threats to the security of the system are identified and characterized.

BP.04.01 Identify applicable threats arising from a natural source.

BP.04.02 Identify applicable threats arising from man-made sources, either accidental or deliberate.

BP.04.03 Identify appropriate units of measure, and applicable ranges, in a specified environment.

BP.04.04 Assess capability and motivation of threat agent for threats arising from man-made sources.

BP.04.05 Assess the likelihood of an occurrence of a threat event.

BP.04.06 Monitor ongoing changes in the threat spectrum and changes to their characteristics.





Goal 1 An understanding of system security vulnerabilities within a defined environment is achieved.

BP.05.01 Select the methods, techniques, and criteria by which security system vulnerabilities in a defined environment are identified and characterized.

BP.05.02 Identify system security vulnerabilities.

BP.05.03 Gather data related to the properties of the vulnerabilities.

BP.05.04 Assess the system vulnerability and aggregate vulnerabilities that result from specific vulnerabilities and combinations of specific vulnerabilities.

BP.05.05 Monitor ongoing changes in the applicable vulnerabilities and changes to their characteristics.





Goal 1 The work products and processes clearly provide the evidence that the customer's security needs have been met.

BP.06.01 Identify the security assurance objectives.

BP.06.02 Define a security assurance strategy to address all assurance objectives.

BP.06.03 Identify and control security assurance evidence.

BP.06.04 Perform analysis of security assurance evidence.

BP.06.05 Provide a security assurance argument that demonstrates the customer's security needs are met.





PA07: Coordinate Security

Goal 1 All members of the project team are aware of and involved with security engineering activities to the extent necessary to perform their functions.

Goal 2 Decisions and recommendations related to security are communicated and coordinated.

BP.07.01 Define security engineering coordination objectives and relationships.

BP.07.02 Identify coordination mechanisms for security engineering.

BP.07.03 Facilitate security engineering coordination.

BP.07.04 Use the identified mechanisms to coordinate decisions and recommendations related to security.





PA08: Monitor Security Posture

Goal 1 Both internal and external security related events are detected and tracked.

Goal 2 Incidents are responded to in accordance with policy.

Goal 3 Changes to the operational security posture are identified and handled in accordance with the security objectives.

BP.08.01 Analyze event records to determine the cause of an event, how it proceeded, and likely future events.

BP.08.02 Monitor changes in threats, vulnerabilities, impacts, risks, and the environment.

BP.08.03 Identify security relevant incidents.

BP.08.04 Monitor the performance and functional effectiveness of security safeguards.

BP.08.05 Review the security posture of the system to identify necessary changes.

BP.08.06 Manage the response to security relevant incidents.

BP.08.07 Ensure that the artifacts related to security monitoring are suitably protected.





PA09: Provide Security Input

Goal 1 All system issues are reviewed for security implications and are resolved in accordance with security goals.

Goal 2 All members of the project team have an understanding of security so they can perform their functions.

Goal 3 The solution reflects the security input provided.

BP.09.01 Work with designers, developers, and users to ensure that appropriate parties have a common understanding of security input needs. BP.09.02 Determine the security constraints and considerations needed to make informed engineering choices.

BP.09.03 Identify alternative solutions to security related engineering problems.

BP.09.04 Analyze and prioritize engineering alternatives using security constraints and considerations.

BP.09.05 Provide security related guidance to the other engineering groups. BP.09.06 Provide security related guidance to operational system users and administrators.





Goal 1 A common understanding of security needs is reached between all parties, including the customer.

BP.10.01 Gain an understanding of the customer's security needs. BP.10.02 Identify the laws, policies, standards, external influences and constraints that govern the system.

BP.10.03 Identify the purpose of the system in order to determine the security context.

BP.10.04 Capture a high-level security oriented view of the system operation.

BP.10.05 Capture high-level goals that define the security of the system. BP.10.06 Define a consistent set of statements which define the protection to be implemented in the system.

BP.10.07 Obtain agreement that the specified security meets the customer's needs.





Goal 1 Solutions meet security requirements. Goal 2 Solutions meet the customer's operational security needs.

BP.11.01 Identify the solution to be verified and validated. BP.11.02 Define the approach and level of rigor for verifying and validating each solution.

BP.11.03 Verify that the solution implements the requirements associated with the previous level of abstraction.

BP.11.04 Validate the solution by showing that it satisfies the needs associated with the previous level of abstraction, ultimately meeting the customer's operational security needs.

BP.11.05 Capture the verification and validation results for the other engineering groups.





IATF's ISSE Process

ISSE process activities are related to SE Process activities

SE Activities	ISSE Activities	
Discover Needs	Discover Information Protection Needs	
The systems engineer helps the customer understand and document the information management needs that support the business or mission. Statements about information needs may be captured in an information management model (IMM).	The information systems security engineer helps the customer understand the information protection needs that support the mission or business. Statements about information protection needs may be captured in an Information Protection Policy (IPP).	
Define System Requirements	Define System Security Requirements	
The systems engineer allocates identified needs to systems. A system context is developed to identify the system environment and to show the allocation of system functions to that environment. A preliminary system Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is written to describe operational aspects of the candidate system (or systems). Baseline requirements are established.	The information systems security engineer allocates information protection needs to systems. A system security context, a preliminary system security CONOPS, and baseline security requirements are developed.	
Design System Architecture	Design System Security Architecture	
The systems engineer performs functional analysis and allocation by analyzing candidate architectures, allocating requirements, and selecting mechanisms. The systems engineer identifies components or elements, allocates functions to those elements, and describes the relationships between the elements.	The information systems security engineer works with the systems engineer in the areas of functional analysis and allocation by analyzing candidate architectures, allocating security services, and selecting security mechanisms. The information systems security engineer identifies components or elements, allocates security functions to those elements, and describes the relationships between the elements.	



IATF Document, Chapter 3, pp. 3-3 & 3-4



IATF's ISSE Process (2)

ISSE process activities are related to SE Process activities (2)

SE Activities	ISSE Activities	
Develop Detailed Design	Develop Detailed Security Design	
The systems engineer analyzes design constraints, analyzes trade-offs, does detailed system design, and considers life-cycle support. The systems engineer traces all of the system requirements to the elements until all are addressed. The final detailed design results in component and interface specifications that provide sufficient information for acquisition when the system is implemented.	The information systems security engineer analyzes design constraints, analyzes trade-offs, does detailed system and security design, and considers life-cycle support. The information systems security engineer traces all of the system security requirements to the elements until all are addressed. The final detailed security design results in component and interface specifications that provide sufficient information for acquisition when the system is implemented.	
Implement System	Implement System Security	
The systems engineer moves the system from specifications to the tangible. The main activities are acquisition, integration, configuration, testing, documentation, and training. Components are tested and evaluated to ensure that they meet the specifications. After successful testing, the individual components—hardware, software, and firmware—are integrated, properly configured, and tested as a system.	The information systems security engineer participates in a multidisciplinary examination of all system issues and provides inputs to C&A process activities, such as verification that the system as implemented protects against the threats identified in the original threat assessment; tracking of information protection assurance mechanisms related to system implementation and testing practices; and providing inputs to system life-cycle support plans, operational procedures, and maintenance training materials.	
Assess Effectiveness	Assess Information Protection Effectiveness	
The results of each activity are evaluated to ensure that the system will meet the users' needs by performing the required functions to the required quality standard in the intended environment. The systems engineer examines how well the system meets the needs of the mission.	The information systems security engineer focuses on the effectiveness of the information protection— whether the system can provide the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and nonrepudiation for the information it is processing that is required for mission success.	





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List

Activity-01 Discover Information Protection Needs

- Task-01.1 Analyze organization's mission
- Task-01.2 Determine relationship and importance of information to mission
- Task-01.3 Identify legal and regulatory requirements
- Task-01.4 Identify classes of threats
- Task-01.5 Determine impacts
- Task-01.6 Identify security services
- Task-01.7 Document the information protection needs
- Task-01.8 Document security management roles and responsibilities
- Task-01.9 Identify design constraints
- Task-01.10 Assess information protection effectiveness
 - Subtask-01.10.1 Provide/present documented information protection needs to the customer
 - Subtask-01.10.2 Obtain concurrence from the customer in the information protection needs

Task-01.11 Support system certification and accreditation (C&A)

- Subtask-01.11.1 Identify Designated Approving Authority (DAA)/Accreditor
- Subtask-01.11.2 Identify Certification Authority/Certifier
- Subtask-01.11.3 Identify C&A and acquisition processes to be applied

Subtask-01.11.4 Ensure Accreditor's and Certifier's concurrence in the information protection needs





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (2)

Activity-02 Define System Security Requirements

Task-02.1 Develop system security context Subtask-02.1.1 Define system boundaries and interfaces with SE Subtask-02.1.2 Document security allocations to target system and external systems Subtask-02.1.3 Identify data flows between the target system and external systems and the protection needs associated with those flows Develop security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Task-02.2 Task-02.3 Develop system security requirements baseline Subtask-02.3.1 Define system security requirements Subtask-02.3.2 Define system security modes of operation Subtask-02.3.3 Define system security performance measures Review design constraints Task-02.4 Task-02.5 Assess information protection effectiveness Subtask-02.5.1 Provide and present security context, security CONOPS, and system security requirements to the customer Subtask-02.5.2 Obtain concurrence from the customer in system security context, CONOPS, and requirements Task-02.6 Support system C&A Subtask-02.6.1 Ensure Accreditor's and Certifier's concurrence in system

security context, CONOPS, and requirements






IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (3)

Activity-03 Design System Security Architecture

Task-03.1 Perform	n functional analysis and allocation
Subtask-03.1.1	Analyze candidate systems architectures
Subtask-03.1.2	Allocate security services to architecture
Subtask-03.1.3	Select mechanism types
Subtask-03.1.4	Submit security architecture(s) for evaluation
Subtask-03.1.5	Revise security architecture(s)
Subtask-03.1.6	Select security architecture
Task-03.2 Assess	information protection effectiveness
Subtask-03.2.1	Ensure that the selected security mechanisms provide the required security services
Subtask-03.2.2	Explain to the customer how the security architecture meets the security requirements
Subtask-03.2.3	Generate risk projection
Subtask-05.2.5	Ocherate riste projection

Subtask-03.3.1Prepare and submit final architecture documentation for risk
analysisSubtask-03.3.2Coordinate results of the risk analysis with Accreditor and







IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (4)

Activity-04 Develop Detailed Security Design

Task-04.1	Ensure compliance with security architecture			
Task-04.2	Perform	1 trade-off studies		
Task-04.3	Define :	system security design elements		
Subtask- Subtask-		Allocate security mechanisms to system security design elements Identify candidate commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)/government off-the-shelf (GOTS) security products		
Subtask-	-04.3.3	Identify custom security products		
Subtask-	-04.3.4	Qualify element and system interfaces (internal and external)		
Subtask-	-04.3.5	Develop specifications		
Task-04.4	Assess	information protection effectiveness		
Subtask-	-04.4.1	Conduct design risk analysis		
Subtask-	-04.4.2	Ensure that the selected security design provides the required security services		
Subtask-	-04.4.3	Explain to the customer how the security design meets the security requirements		
Subtask-	-04.4.4	Explain to the customer, and document, any residual risks of the design		
Subtask-	-04.4.5	Obtain concurrence from the customer in the detailed security design		

Task-04.5 Support system C&A

Subtask-04.5.1 Prepare and submit detailed design documentation for risk analysis
 Subtask-04.5.2 Coordinate results of the risk analysis with Accreditor and Certifier





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (5)

Activity-05 Implement System Security

Task-05.1 S	upport :	security implementation and integration
Subtask-0. Subtask-0.	5.1.2	Participate in implementation planning Verify interoperability of security tools and mechanisms
Subtask-0. Subtask-0.		Verify implementation against security design Verify that the security components have been evaluated against the selected evaluation criteria
Subtask-0.	5.1.5	Assist in the integration of the components to ensure that their integration meets the system security specifications and does not alter the component specifications
Subtask-0.	5.1.6	Assist in the configuration of the components to ensure that the security features are enabled and the security parameters are correctly set to provide the required security services
Subtask-0.	5.1.7	Ensure that system and component configurations are documented and placed under configuration management
Task-05.2 S	upport f	test and evaluation
Subtask-0.	5.2.1	Build test and evaluation strategy (includes demonstration, observation, analysis, and testing)
Subtask-0.	5.2.2	Assess available test and evaluation data for applicability (e.g., CCEP, NIAP, internal)
Subtask-0. Subtask-0.		Support development of test and evaluation procedures Support test and evaluation activities
Task-05.3 A	ssess i	uformation protection effectiveness
Subtask-0.	5.3.1	Monitor to ensure that the security design is implemented correctly
Subtask-0. Subtask-0.		Conduct or update risk analysis Define the risks and possible mission impacts and advise the customer and the customer's Certifiers and Accreditors
Task-05.4 S	upport :	system C&A
Subtask-0.	5.4.1	Ensure the completeness of the required C&A documentation with the customer and the customer's Certifiers and Accreditors
Subtask-0.	0.000	Provide documentation and analysis as required for the C&A process
Task-05.5 S		security training





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (6)

Activity-06 Assess Information Protection Effectiveness

Assessing the effectiveness of the information protection occurs in conjunction with the activities of Discover Information Protection Needs, Define System Security Requirements, Design System Security Architecture, Develop Detailed Security Design, and Implement System Security. The Assess Information Protection Effectiveness task and subtasks are listed with the associated activities.





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (7)

Activity-07 Plan Technical Effort

Planning the technical effort occurs throughout the ISSE process. The information systems security engineer must review each of the following areas to scope support to the customer in conjunction with the other activities. This set of tasks is recognized separately because it is applied similarly across all of the other activities, requires a unique skill set, and is likely to be assigned to senior-level personnel.

- Task-07.1 Estimate project scope
- Task-07.2 Identify resources and availability
- Task-07.3 Identify roles and responsibilities
- Task-07.4 Estimate project costs
- Task-07.5 Develop project schedule
- Task-07.6 Identify technical activities
- Task-07.7 Identify deliverables
- Task-07.8 Define management interfaces
- Task-07.9 Prepare technical management plan
- Task-07.10 Review project plan
- Task-07.11 Obtain customer agreement





IATF's ISSE Master Activity and Task List (8)

Activity-08 Manage Technical Effort

Managing the technical effort occurs throughout the ISSE process. The information systems security engineer must review all technical activities and documentation to ensure quality in conjunction with the other activities. This set of tasks is recognized separately because it is applied similarly across all of the other activities, requires a unique skill set, and is likely to be assigned to senior-level personnel.

- Task-08.1 Direct technical effort
- Task-08.2 Track project resources
- Task-08.3 Track technical parameters
- Task-08.4 Monitor progress of technical activities
- Task-08.5 Ensure quality of deliverables
- Task-08.6 Manage configuration elements
- Task-08.7 Review project performance
- Task-08.8 Report project status

