



# The Insider Threat

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August 6, 2003



# Session Overview

- ◆ Introduction
- ◆ The Indispensable Role of the Insider
- ◆ Who is the Insider Threat?
- ◆ Insider Threat and Lack of Knowledge
- ◆ Insider Threat and Social Engineering
- ◆ Protecting Your Network Against the Insider Threat
- ◆ Conclusions



# Before We Get Started

## ◆ My Background:

- In The IT Field for 22 Years – Security for About 16
- Currently President and CEO of Privisec, Inc.
- Previously President and CEO of PoliVec, Inc.
- Before That, SVP and CTO of Trident Data Systems
- Academic Credentials:
  - Doctorate in Computer Science From Colorado Technical University, Masters and Bachelors Degrees in Computers as Well...So I'm a Geek...And, Remember: Geek is Sheik!
  - CISSP Since Forever as Well
- Other Information:
  - Technical Editor for Business Security Advisor Magazine, Formally Internet Security Advisor Magazine
  - Numerous Publications, Conferences, etc.



# Introduction

- ◆ When Thinking About Information Security, the Insider Threat Must be Addressed
- ◆ The Insider can be a Threat Against all Three Fundamental Security Principles:
  - Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
- ◆ Insider Problems Exist Today Within our Critical Infrastructure
  - Military, Telecommunications, Energy




# Introduction

- ◆ Over Half of all Threats Come From Within the Enterprise
  - 70-80% Come From Within According to Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Computer Security Institute
  - Over 51% According to a Meta Group Report, and IDC Survey
  - Statistics may be Skewed Because Many Organizations do not Report Insider Attacks...Worse, Many Went or are Going on Undetected
- ◆ The Insider Represents the **Greatest** Threat to Security Because of Their Understanding of the Organizations Business and Systems



## What are the Top Five Threats to Enterprise Network Security?



Source: 2003 InfoWorld Security Survey



# Introduction

- ◆ Due to Their Knowledge and Understanding of Internal Systems and Controls, Insider Attacks are More Likely to be Successful
- ◆ The Insider Threat the Greatest Challenge in Securing Your Enterprise Because They are Authorized a Level of Access and Must be Granted a Degree of Trust
- ◆ Most Organizations Don't Want to Consider or Prepare for an Insider Attack as it is "Uncomfortable"





# The Indispensable Role of the Insider

- ◆ It is Important to Note That the Efforts of “Outside” Groups Can be Aided Significantly by the Assistance of Parties Within the Organization
  - Insiders Have Access to, and Knowledge of, Critical Systems
  - For Certain Secure, Self-Contained Systems, the Insider’s Access can Prove Indispensable





# The Indispensable Role of the Insider

- ◆ The Insider May be “Self” Motivated, Recruited Directly, Recruited Indirectly, Coerced Through Blackmail, or Through Social Engineering
- ◆ The Potential Damage an Insider can now Commit has Also Been Increased Within the Last Decade by Two Related Trends:
  - Consolidation
  - Elimination of the “Need to Know” Principle



# Who Is The Insider Threat?

- ◆ Insiders are Those Individuals who Work for or Have a Relationship With the Target Organization
  - Employees
  - Contractors
  - Business Partners
  - Subcontractors
  - Consultants
  - Customers



# Who Is The Insider Threat?

- ◆ Many Types of Employees:
  - Disgruntled Employees
  - Paid Informants
  - Compromised or Coerced Employees
  - Former Employees
- ◆ Insider Motives Include:
  - Financial
  - Social
  - Political
  - Personal



# Case Study 1: The FBI Agent

- ◆ Robert Phillip Hanssen, a Career FBI Agent was Charged With Spying for Russia From 1985 to 2001
- ◆ Hanssen had Significant IT Experience and Access
- ◆ He Allegedly Gave Russian Intelligence Agents Highly Classified Documents About US Intelligence Sources and Electronic Surveillance, in Exchange for an Estimated \$1.4M in Cash and Diamonds
- ◆ Hanssen Used his Computer Access to the FBI's Electronic Case File System, Which Contains Information About On-Going FBI Investigations, to Check Whether the FBI was Aware of his Activities



# Case Study 1: Lessons Learned

- ◆ Since Hanssen was an Authorized User, his Queries Didn't Raise Any Suspicion...Obviously Their Log Reduction and Analysis Process Was Less Than Optimal...
- ◆ After his Arrest, the FBI Correlated his log Activity in the Database With his Espionage Activities
- ◆ “In Short, the Trusted Insider Betrayed his Trust Without Detection,” FBI Director Louis Freeh Stated at a Press Conference



## Case Study 2: Gov't Contractor

- ◆ An IT Professional at a Military Base Learned she was Going to be “Downsized”
- ◆ She Decided to Encrypt Large Parts of the Organization’s Database and Holds it Hostage
- ◆ She Contacted the Systems Administrator Responsible for the Database and Offered to Decode the Data for \$10,000 in “Severance Pay” With Promise of NO Prosecution
- ◆ SA Agrees Before Consulting Proper Authorities



## Case Study 2: Lessons Learned

- ◆ Prosecutors Reviewing the Case Determined That the Administrator's Deal Precluded Them From Pursuing Charges
- ◆ The Insider Walked!
- ◆ If Confronted With This Type of Extortion, Be Very Careful About What is Said and/or Done....





## Case Study 3: Active Duty

- ◆ A Postcard Written by an Enlisted Person was Discovered During the Arrest of Several Members of a Well-Known Hacker Group (by the FBI)
- ◆ The Postcard was Written by the Active Duty Person From Their Military Base Where he Served as a Computer Specialist!
- ◆ While on Active Duty he Gets Caught Breaking Into Local Phone Systems



## Case Study 3: Lessons Learned

- ◆ Investigation Reveals the Man to be a Convicted Hacker and Former Member of the Group Who was Offered a Choice Between Prison and Enlistment
- ◆ Poor or Missing Background Checks Allowed Individual to Gain Privileged Access to Government Computing Systems
- ◆ These Two Examples Demonstrate the Threat Posed by Privileged Users, Such as System Administrators, Programmers, Network Engineers, etc.



## Case Study 4: The Subcontractor

- ◆ Zhangyi Liu, a Chinese Computer Programmer Working as a Subcontractor for Litton/PRC, Inc., Illegally Accessed Sensitive Air Force Information on Combat Readiness
- ◆ He Also Copied Passwords, Which Allowed Users to Create, Modify, and/or Delete Any File on the Network...He Posted These on the Internet!



## Case Study 4: Lessons Learned

- ◆ This Example Demonstrates the Espionage Threat Posed by Contractors
- ◆ The Insider Threat Must be Evaluated and Addressed Throughout the Entire “Business Process”
- ◆ In This Case, The Prime Contractor Failed to Ensure the Subcontractor Addressed the Contractual Security Requirements
- ◆ Worse, the Gov’t Did Not Have an Effective Mechanism to Address This Potential Threat...Allowed the Insider the Access Needed to Compromise the System



# The Insider Threat and the Lack of Knowledge

- ◆ Many Network Abuses are a Direct Results of Employees' Lack of Knowledge
- ◆ Educating Users is Essential to Computer Security
  - Users Should be Aware of Their Organization's Security Policy and Practices
  - Users Should Understand the Risks of Allowing Other Users Access to Their Accounts, Passwords, Etc.
  - Users Should be Made Aware of the Inherent Risks Associated With Opening Insecure Access on Their Personal Computers or Other Systems
    - Running Web Servers, ftp Servers, etc.
- ◆ Enforce the Principle of Least Privilege




# The Insider Threat and the Lack of Knowledge

- ◆ We Have all Read or Heard That the Insider Threat Accounts for up to 80% of all Security Related Problems
- ◆ What is Possibly More Disturbing is That Over Half of all Insider Attacks are Unintentional
- ◆ In Many Cases These “Attacks” are Simply Mistakes, Experiments, or Accidents...Not Malicious





## What are the Top Five Threats to Enterprise Network Security?



Source: 2003 InfoWorld Security Survey





# Case Study 5: The Unintentional Threat

- ◆ I was Asked to Investigate a Suspected Denial of Service Attack Against a System Residing on a Military Installation
- ◆ After Arriving On-Site, Determined the System Was Running, But That No One Could Access The System
- ◆ Basically Had to “Break Into” The System and Then Try to Determine What Had Happened....



## Case Study 5...

- ◆ After Gaining Access to the System, Found That the /etc/password File was not Available
- ◆ Searched the Log Files and Found That the File had Been Accessed by a Privileged User (SA)
- ◆ Searched the SA's Home Directory and Found the File
- ◆ Turned Out the SA, a Lieutenant, was a Novice Unix SA and Accidentally Mistook the Move Command for Copy Command...Did Not Realize Move Did Not Make a Copy...
- ◆ As Folks Logged Off...They Were Locked Out



# The Insider Threat and Social Engineering

- ◆ Social Engineering is a Low-Tech Method of Cracking Network Security
- ◆ Manipulates People Inside the Network Into Providing the Necessary Information to Gain Access
- ◆ Some Tactics:
  - Requesting “Help” From a Sympathetic and Unsuspecting User
  - Requesting Information Just Before Quitting Time
  - Masquerading as a Valid User, Manager, Supervisor, Etc.



# The Insider Threat and Social Engineering

- ◆ Social Engineering can be a Very Effective Means of Attack and Intrusion
- ◆ It Plays on the Human Desire to be Helpful and to do the “Right Thing”
- ◆ The Defense Against Social Engineering Attacks is an Effective Security Awareness and Training Program
  - Must Inform Users of the These Types of Attacks, to Include Methods and Potential Damages



# Protecting Your Network Against Attack

- ◆ First and Foremost, Establish a Sound Enterprise Security Policy, Implement it and Enforce it!
- ◆ Security Policies Should be Coupled With Platform Specific Implementation Specs
- ◆ Educating Users is Also Critical to Developing and Maintaining a Reasonable Security Posture
  - Train Users on the Use of Strong Passwords
  - Ensure That Users Understand how Viruses and Other Programmed Threats Spread and What They Can do to Prevent Such Spreading
  - Make Sure Users are Aware of Social Engineering and how to Handle Such Situations



# Protecting Your Network Against Attack

## ◆ Additional Protective Measures:

- Conduct Routine Security Evaluations and Audits
- Ensure Dial-In Access Control
- Make Use of Existing Security Features and Mechanisms (Consistently Across Platforms)
- Eliminate Security Holes – Install Software Updates and Patches
- Improve Coordination Between Operations Staff and Information Security Staff
- Improve Skills of the Security Staff
- Establish Security Awareness and Training Programs
- Run Backups and Store in a Safe Place (Off-Site)





# Protecting Your Network Against Attack

## ◆ Additional Protective Measures:

- Install and Execute Appropriate Anti-Virus Tools (Keep Updated...Engines and Data Files)
- Routinely Check for and Update Threat Detection Tools as Needed, Especially When New Threats are Discovered
- Monitor and Manage Firewall Configuration and Rule Sets (Inbound and Outbound)
- Enforce the Principle of Least Privilege
- Pre-employment Screening





# Protecting Your Network Against Attack



# Protecting Your Network Against Attack


- ◆ The Biggest Threat to Your Organizations Will Likely Come From the “Trusted Insider”
- ◆ Security is Not Mainly About Software, Locks, Biometrics, or Process
- ◆ First and Foremost it’s About People and Policies
- ◆ Consider a Layered Security Model to Protect Your Organization



# A Layered Security Model

- ◆ Combination of Administrative and Technical Mechanisms
- ◆ Starts With a Commitment to an Information Security Program
  - Dedicate Appropriate Resources and Budget
  - Give Authority to Execute to Company Goals
  - Comprehensive IT Security Policy is a Key Element
  - Must Consider a Process, Not a Project
    - Not Just a GLB Requirement, but a Necessity
      - Need to Account for Changes in Business Model, Services Offered, Technology Updates and New Vulnerabilities

# A Layered Security Model





# A Layered Security Model

- ◆ **Administrative Security**
  - Security Policies, Standards, Guidelines
- ◆ **Technical Security Mechanisms**
  - Architectural Security
  - Perimeter/Network Security
  - Host-Based
- ◆ **Incident Response and Recovery**
- ◆ **Procedural Security**
  - Baseline Protection (Accreditation Process)
- ◆ **Security Training and Awareness**



# Administrative Security

- ◆ Develop and Implement a Consistent Security Policy Across the Enterprise
- ◆ Describe The Company's General Security Requirements and Guidelines
  - Roles and Responsibilities
  - Data Classifications and Protection Requirements
  - Enterprise Access Requirements/Process
  - Identification, Authentication, and Auditing
  - Internet Access/Services
  - Dial-Up, Virus Protection....
  - Identify/Describe Use of Standards/Guidelines
- ◆ **Make It Official - Make It Mandatory**



# Administrative Security

- ◆ One of the Biggest Reasons Firms are Vulnerable is Because They Have NOT Established and Implemented a Formal Security Policy
- ◆ As a Result, Systems are NOT Consistently Configured and Weaknesses are Common
- ◆ Carnegie Mellon University Estimates That 99% of all Reported Intrusions “Result Through Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities or Configuration Errors, for Which Countermeasures Were Available”





# Technical Security -Architecture

- ◆ It's Much Easier to Design Security Into an Enterprise Than to Retrofit it
- ◆ Evaluate Business Objectives Against the Architecture and Determine What is Required
  - Firewalls and Other Remote Access Controls
  - May Require One or More Demilitarized Zones
  - Intranets and Extranets
  - Web Servers
  - Controlled Dial-In Access
  - VPN-Based Connections
  - Application and Data Segmentation
  - Trust Relationships



# Technical Security - Perimeter

## ◆ Firewalls

- Good For Internet and Intranet Applications
- Many New Features and Services
  - URL/Java Blocking and Screening
  - Virus Protection
  - VPN and Authentication (Data Encryption)
  - WWW Server Load balancing
  - Network Management Integration
  - Secure Dial-In Via Firewall

## ◆ Other Secure Remote Access Technologies

- Virtual Private Networks
- Secure Remote Access (Dial-In)



# Technical Security - Hosts

- ◆ Just as Important as Perimeter
- ◆ Standard Operating Systems Configurations
  - Password Security, Account Structure, and Audits
  - Trust Relationships (Host Files)
  - Directory and File Permissions
  - Patch Levels and/or Hot Fixes
  - Service Offerings (Like telnet, ftp, etc.)
  - Standardized Virus Protection Software
- ◆ Be Consistent, Regardless of Platform or Operating System Type



# Incident Handling and Response

## ◆ Incident Handling and Response

- Who Receives and Distributes Security Warnings and Advisories (CERTs, CIAC, Vendor, Other)?
- What do I do if I Notice a Problem, Like a Break-in Attempt?
- These are Critical Questions to ask. Remember the Case Studies....

## ◆ Incident Handling is Critical

- The Reason Most Credit Unions are Vulnerable is Because They are NOT Aware of Potential Vulnerabilities or Their Solutions



# Procedural Security

- ◆ Protecting the Baseline
  - Update Virus Protection Data Files and/or Engines
  - Enforce the Use of Standards and Guidelines
    - Make Compliance Mandatory and Enforce it!
  - Periodic Audits and Controlled Penetrations
- ◆ Formal “Accreditation” Process
  - Requires Assessment and Compliance
  - Periodic Re-Certifications Required
  - Re-Certify IF Security Relevant Event Occurs



# Security Training And Awareness

- ◆ If I Don't Know What to Protect or Why I Should Protect It, I Won't!
  - What Data is Sensitive?
  - What Are The Threats?
- ◆ Make Folks Aware of Security Issues and Requirements
- ◆ Approach From an Enabling Standpoint, Not a Restrictive Standpoint
- ◆ Bottomline: You Cannot Protect a System From Trusted Users - Better to Educate and Train





# Conclusions

- ◆ A Reasonably Secure Infrastructure is Achievable
  - Must View Security as a Process, Not a Project
  - Embrace Technology and Use it!
  - Be Consistent Throughout the Enterprise
  - Consider the Entire Business Process, Not Just the Transaction Component
- ◆ Think About Security From an Enabling Standpoint vs. an Inhibitor
- ◆ Be Proactive, Don't Wait For a Problem to Occur or it Will