Wireless LANs, Best Practices Session Two

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II. Best Practices

- After several years of dealing with Wireless LANs, we have learned some things
- Wireless devices can be deployed, but security must be a major consideration
- Turn on 128 bit WEP to protect the network
- Use WPA if your devices will allow it
- Get 802.1i equipment/software when it comes available
- Use End-to-End Encryption to protect data

- Turn off beacons, if possible
 - Some manufactures allow this, others do not
 - All your clients know the SSID of the WAP and the correct RF channel to transmit on
 - There may be a problem if you have multiple access points some of which are repeaters
 - Repeaters require beacons to stay coordinated


- Cloak SSIDs
 - Some manufacturers allow this
 - If you must have a beacon (i.e. slave repeaters)
 then do not broadcast the SSID of the WAP
 - This stops casual snoopers using NetStumbler
 - It will not defeat kismet or kismac and the serious hacker

- Turn on WEP and Change Keys Often
- Yes, WEP can be broken by a determined hacker use it anyway protect the network
- Most hackers go for the low hanging fruit the WAPs with no WEP turned on
- In my 50 mile commute, I count 210 WAPs with only 34 using WEP (one is my bank)

Best Practice 3 (cont)

- WEP is not to protect information (the data you are sending and receiving)
- WEP is to protect your network
- Even if you use a VPN, turn on WEP, you are responsible for your network
- With no WEP in use, your devices become an instant "Hotspot" (minus the coffee)
- Hackers love hotspots It hides their identity

- Employ Virtual LANs (VLANs)
- Do not just throw a WAP on your wired LAN and declare wireless access
- Segregate your wireless activity from your main organizational wired network using a Firewall
- With no VLAN, you are more vulnerable for an attack



- Employ Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels to protect your data
- Only allow traffic using protocol 50, protocol 51, and port 500 (IPSEC)
- If you can not authenticate with the VPN, you can not participate in the network
- You could still have a problem of traffic between WAPs directly (some WAPs do not allow this)
- Some VPNs may cause speed problems requiring the turning off of WEP (modern hardware is better)
- All your "road warriors" should be using the VPN

- War drive (or walk/sit) your own territory frequently
- Use kismet CD in your normal Windows laptop (available on WWW for download)
- Use prism2 based PCMCIA wireless card
- Can use kismet on Sharp Zaurus for walking discovery (where in the detected building is the rogue WAP?)

- Employ only minimum (as needed) transmit power
 - Find a WAP that allows you to set the power output in software
 - Find PCMCIA wireless cards or devices for your clients that allow setting of output power

- Employ only minimum "as needed" antenna gain
 - Use antenna placement to shape your coverage area
 - Probably you do not need coverage in the parking lot or the Burger King down the street
 - Remember hackers use maximum antenna gain to find you and join your network so do not make it easy for them

- Change all system defaults that came from the manufacturer
 - Hackers know default settings for all WAPs (they are published on the WWW)
 - Do not allow "ANY" authentication/association (require clients to supply the correct SSID)
 - For administration of the WAP, best is serial wire (avoid WEB, telnet, snmp)

- Aggressively manage IP address space never use DHCP
 - If a rogue client manages to authenticate and associate with your WAP, they will need an address so do not just give them one
 - Know all your addresses and use software tools to detect new addresses appearing (WIDS and IDS can help)

- Employ an Access Control List (ACL) Only your clients work with your WAP(s)
 - Yes, MAC addresses can be spoofed, but use an ACL to control your network
 - These can usually be set right in the WAP
 - Keep your neighbors honest
 - If hacker uses your devices, the FBI visits YOU (hacker is never found) and PATROIT act makes you history (no bail - no lawyer - no trial)

- Administer your WAP from the wired side, if possible
 - Best way is to connect by separate serial connection direct to the WAP
 - Turn off SNMP, Web Access, and TELNET administration
 - If you must use these, make the password strong (no dictionary words even with substitutions)

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- If you can afford it (and if you are a forprofit enterprise, you cannot afford not to) employ a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS)
- New systems do not accept WAP authentication/association outside of approved physical areas

Best Practice 13 (continued)

- A modern WIDS will deploy many sensors (really converted wireless access points)
- The sensors listen to all wireless emitters and report strength and MAC address to a server
- At the server, software performs geolocation of the emitter
- A stored profile of what is authorized is checked for each emitter
- If an emitter is detected that does not fit the profile (in the wrong place no parking lot) the WAP is informed to not let the emitter authenticate/associate

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- You should employ a wired IDS also (SNORT is free and great)
- Reminder Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is in use everywhere
- Your wired IDS should detect OSI Level 2 attacks like ARP Cache Poison, ensure your IDS has "ARPWATCH" capability
- ARPWATCH is an open source program that monitors ethernet-IP address pairings and reports mischief

Best Practice 14 (continued)

- The mischief centers around your VPN
- Remember we said only allow protocol 50, protocol 51 and port 500 traffic on your network (everything else is in the encrypted tunnel)
- What I did not tell you is your VPN passes ARP traffic you find life hard without ARP
- Some VPNs allow you to turn ARP off, but you have big routing troubles without it
- So, leave ARP on, but check for mischief with your wired IDS

- Draft your Wireless LAN Policy as a part of your Computer Network policy
- Disseminate your policy to all employees
- Employees should not be able to deploy their own computer equipment or software
- If you have no policy, you can be sure you will get a rouge WAP eventually (you may anyway but remember the lawyers)

- Plan First
- Perform System Engineering Study and determine Wireless LAN requirements
- Identify and Mitigate Risks (our Keynote speaker mentioned this)
- Deploy Wireless LAN WAPs and Clients
 - During site survey, determine best placement for minimum RF footprint
- Monitor wireless and wired network for intrusion

- If throughput or device sophistication allows, use Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- This uses a WEP session key with a new key every packet (not based on the IV)
- Some handheld devices with built in wireless can not do this
 - Bar Code Scanners, an example

Example One - Good Security

• Maintenance handheld computers using wireless network cards (maintenance personnel get manual pages online and log maintenance done online)

– Security: Use VLAN, WPA, and VPN

- In the military, Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns "sensitive but unclassified" data
- In the commercial world, OPSEC would mean "sensitive but not proprietary" data
- Perform an OPSEC study (risk assessment) to determine if your data needs the VPN maybe not

Example Two - Good Security

- Handheld bar code readers using wireless network cards (logistic personnel perform inventory online)
 - Security: Use VLAN and WEP
 - As mentioned, WPA probably not available on these devices (yet)

Example 3 - Good Wireless Security

- Cash registers report all transactions to server
 - TURN WEP ON (remember credit/debit card transactions)
 - Security: Use VLAN and WEP (WAP probably not available)

More Examples of Wireless Systems with Security

- Road warrior salesman gets latest catalog information while at Starbucks hot spot
 - Use VPN (so competitor sitting at Starbucks does not share the same information)
- Road warrior salesman gets latest catalog information wireless in guest cubicle of corporate headquarters
 - Use VPN

Case Study One

- High ranking executives use lap top computers to wireless access the corporate network
- They connect to a WAP using WPA (requiring a WEP key), ACL, RADIUS server authentication, VPN authentication
- They have to type their user name and password several times and have the right WEP key (which changes every 90 days)
- They do not like all this username and password stuff, they want "single sign on"

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Case Study One (continued)

- A system engineer (not me) figures the VPN is protecting the data, so set up the WAP with WPA off and forget the RADIUS server, but leave the ACLs
- Remember only protocol 50, protocol 51, and port 500 allowed on the network
- System engineer figures everything is still secure
- So the high ranking executive only needs to provide their user name and password once (single sign on)
- Do you see the Problem?

Case Study One (continued)

- The problem is the VPN protects the data
- The network is wide open to hackers
- Hacker observes network packets (at level two management frames)
- She sees the clients of the WAP, obtains the SSID of the WAP (after first use by any client)
- She sets her MAC to the MAC of a valid client
- She uses software that allows her poison the ARP cache and become "lady in the middle"
- Now she hacks the network (she has no interest in the data on the network, she wants the hacking platform)

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Case Study Two

- Senior executive lives near his office
- Information Technology Department installs fiber direct to his house so he can get on corporate network and work from home
- Suspend reality for a minute and forget about the fiber tap we studied
- Executive goes to a nearby large computer retail store and buys a WAP, connecting it to the fiber connection
- Now, he can do his work from his patio

Case Study Two (continued)

- Now it is possible to sit in a parking lot near the senior executives house and collect all his data
- If the executive is smart enough to buy a VPN and encrypts his data, then we still have a problem
- The corporate network now becomes a hacking platform for our wiley hacker who no longer needs to get in the middle of anything, just hook up to the WAP
- Solution: The executive makes his requirement know to IT, and IT provides the proper equipment, monitors use, and enforces WEP initial key change often with WPA features turned on

III. Conclusions

- Be sure employees know your computer network policy remind them often
- Remind employees of the importance of not self deploying network devices of any kind
- Road warriors need to call back home with wireless devices use encrypted VPN tunnels for this
- Use WEP (WPA if you can) to protect your network
- Use VPNs to protect your data

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Conclusions (continued)

- Wireless access points are not just another set of "network jacks" to plug into - radio goes further than intended
- With proper attention to security, wireless LANs are useful and desired in our new mobile world
- There is significant ROI using wireless LANs, but do the risk assessment, risk management, risk mitigation, risk consensus
- Policy Requirements Document Risk -Planning - Managed Deployment - Monitoring

Conclusions (continued)

- You must know the RF environment of your enterprise at all times
- Employ a Wireless IDS to detect rogue WAPs or rogue Clients or even Net Stumblers in the parking lot
- Employ ARPWATCH in a Wired IDS if you deployed VPNs for your road warriors
- You might like a Kismet bootable CD for War Driving
- You might like Kismet on Zaurus for War Walking

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Questions

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