

Repelling the Wily Insider

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NebraskaCERT Conference 2005



What Are You Scared Of?



Session focus



- Insiders are evil
 - OK, their not really evil, they just cause the most trouble (see slide above).
- Understanding the Wily Insider
 - Non-technical (human, process, etc.)
 - Technical (software, applications, hardware)
- Defending Against the Wily Insider
 - Non-technical (human, process, etc.)
 - Technical (software, applications, hardware)

External Threats



- Threats:
 - Viruses, worms, network attacks, application-level attacks...
- Defenses are understood but not perfected
 - Firewalls, IDS/IPS, Antivirus, Web Filters...
- Objective is clear: Keep “bad guys” from getting in and/or tracking them when inside
- We can defend because we know what and where to defend:
 - Well-defined entry points!
 - We know where to place defenses
 - Engage in application security testing
 - Usually a clear distinction between good and bad

Internal Threats



- Threats exist from people, processes and applications
- Attacker (users, malicious code) is trusted and already inside the defended perimeter
- What we know about external defenses doesn't apply to the inside!
- The clueless and careless insiders bring external threats inside!
 - Infected laptop – physically or virtually
 - Clicking on an email attachment containing a virus or spyware
 - Visiting malicious web sites
 - Downloading and installing applications
 - Etc.

The Wily Insider




- It is estimated that 80% of computer crime is committed by insiders.¹
- Insiders can be employees, partners, customers or even applications.
- Made possible by the extension of trust – applications, people and processes
- Insiders know what and where the crown jewels are!
- Insider damage may not be intentional (opening infected attachments, creating shares, bringing infected laptops, installing Trojan-ed programs, curiosity, etc.)
- Human error – not technical malfunction – is the most significant cause of IT security breaches in the public and private sectors.²

¹ Source: InterGOV <http://www.intergov.org>.

² Source: CompTIA Survey: <http://www.comptia.org>


The Blurry Definition of “Insider”



Understanding The Wiley Insider



- People
 - Malicious (social engineering)
 - Accidents
- Process
- Technology
 - Software



Understanding Risks - People



- Insiders are those individuals who work for or have a relationship with the target organization
 - Employees
 - Contractors
 - Business Partners
 - Subcontractors
 - Consultants
 - Customers




Understanding Risks - People



- The clueless/careless insider exposes company to:
 - Social engineering
 - Viruses through infected laptops
 - Stolen equipment
 - Mistakes / Accidents
- The malicious insider:
 - Theft
 - Sabotage
 - Espionage



Understanding Humans



- People will use almost any way to get what they want.
- The oldest, easiest and most prevalent method is Social Engineering.
- It is the art & science of using fraudulent methods to gain unauthorized access to an asset.
- Preys on the qualities of human nature:
 - The desire to be helpful
 - The tendency to trust people (especially insiders)
 - The fear of getting into trouble

Plausibility + Dread + Novelty = Compromise

Identity Paradox



Who am I?

How do you know?

How can I prove it to you without compromising my privacy?



Social Engineering Scenarios



- The help desk receives a request to reset a VP's password.
- A copier repairman comes to your front door insisting he be allowed to enter.
- A competitor finds your company phone book in the trash.
- An administrator calls a user requesting their password to fix an application.
- You receive an email from your bank asking you to update your personal information.

Understanding Risks - Processes



- No policies or processes in place (or policies are there, but no one follows them...)
- Mechanisms to enforce security can be used offensively:
 - High password complexity = Stickynote
 - Cached information on laptops
- Insider threat concerns not acted upon:
 - Little security testing done on intranet applications
 - Forensic logs and monitoring are not in place.
 - Centralized administration models
 - Who watches the watchers?

Understanding Risks - Software



- Malware
 - Users clicking on viruses, adware or Trojans not blocked by AV
- 3rd Party Software
 - You're organization inherits software vulnerabilities!
 - Backdoors
 - Trojans
- Internally developed applications
- Internally deployed applications

Defending Against the Wiley Insider



- Threat modeling & simulations
- Risk assessment
- Technology
- Awareness – Trust, but verify



Defenses – Threat Modeling



- What are worst case scenarios for a malicious insider at your company?
 - Intellectual Property theft
 - Sabotage
 - Exploiting company resources
 - Customer information theft
- Which people have the access to pull it off?
 - Create lists of people or roles that have the access necessary to carry out the deed.
 - Lists are useful to deploy technologies/policies and for forensics and prosecution

Defenses – Threat Simulation



- Based on modeling, act out scenarios.
- Either outsource or develop a team internally for social engineering attacks.
- Enlist employees at varying levels for staged malicious insider attacks.
- Imagine act has already occurred- logs?
Contingencies?

Defenses – Technologies



- Access Controls
- Resource locking
- Host IDS
- Resource monitors
- Compartmentalization
- Principal of least privilege

Defenses – Internal Assessments



- Red-Teaming
- Test intranet, partner, customer and extranet applications for security!
- Form focused security test groups that are armed with the tools and techniques of an attacker.
 - Small group
 - Focused on internal applications as if they were externally deployed
- For intranet applications, has testing been done to ensure that user's cannot escalate their privilege?

Defenses – 3rd Party Assessments



- The cost of assessment is eclipsed by the cost of one major unauthorized access
- Independent assessments offer promise
 - Realistic, unbiased evaluations
 - Acceptance testing
 - Inexpensive compared to TCO
- Vendors:



Defenses – Training: Developing a Security-Minded Organization



- Develop and use policies and procedures
- Protect sensitive information and documents appropriately
- Be a little suspicious of unsolicited phone calls, emails or visits
 - TRUST, BUT VERIFY
- Teach personnel how to recognize signs of attack and what to do if they are a victim
- Grow employee knowledge on safe procedures and practices
 - Not just the “what to do” but also the “why”

Defenses – Training: Developing a Security-Minded Organization



- Train employees on secure practices to mitigate risks of:
 - Social engineering
 - Carelessness and its implications e.g. Infected laptop
- Training should be broadly focused – not just IT
- Training programs offered by:



Summary



- The insider threat is very real
- Traditional security practices don't address the threat
- Most companies don't have the necessary checks and balances in place
- There IS hope!
 - Model the threat
 - Plan for contingencies
 - Add appropriate monitors, procedures and policies.
 - **TEST YOUR INTERNAL PROCESSES & APPLICATIONS!!!**
 - Educate

References & Resources



- FTC – Consumer information
<http://www.consumer.gov>
- CERT – Home User
<http://www.cert.org/homeusers>
- Get Net Wise
<http://www.getnetwise.org>
- Microsoft Information Workers Security Handbook
<http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=38060>
- Stay Safe Online
<http://www.staysafeonline.info/>

Questions?



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